Administracija predavanja Prikaži predavanja od do Predavač Naslov HR Naslov EN Tip predavanja Datum Doc. dr. sc. Franjo Šarčević Više... Predavač: Doc. dr. sc. Franjo Šarčević Institucija: Sveučilište u Rijeci, Građevinski fakultetNaslov predavanja (HR): Simplicial complex models for simple games and political structuresNaslov predavanja (EN): Simplicial complex models for simple games and political structuresTip predavanja: Seminar za optimizaciju i primjene Datum i time: 1.04.2026., 12:00 Predavaonica: Predavaonica 2Sažetak (HR): Simplicial complexes are a natural tool for modeling structures in which interactions between objects exist, such as simple (voting) games and political structures. The geometric realizations of these simplicial complexes are topological spaces whose properties tell us something about the modeled structures. In the context of simple games, we model weighted voting games in which certain coalitions are considered impossible, and we provide simplicial complex formulas for power indices (Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik) of games with unfeasible coalitions. For political structures, we focus on the concept of stability, investigating whether introducing - in different ways - a mediator or many mediators into a structure increases stability, and how stability is affected when an agent is split into two.Sažetak (EN): Simplicial complexes are a natural tool for modeling structures in which interactions between objects exist, such as simple (voting) games and political structures. The geometric realizations of these simplicial complexes are topological spaces whose properties tell us something about the modeled structures. In the context of simple games, we model weighted voting games in which certain coalitions are considered impossible, and we provide simplicial complex formulas for power indices (Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik) of games with unfeasible coalitions. For political structures, we focus on the concept of stability, investigating whether introducing - in different ways - a mediator or many mediators into a structure increases stability, and how stability is affected when an agent is split into two.Simplicial complex models for simple games and political structuresSimplicial complex models for simple games and political structuresSeminar za optimizaciju i primjene1.04.2026.Prof. dr. sc. Sanja Konjik Više... Predavač: Prof. dr. sc. Sanja Konjik Institucija: Faculty of Sciences, University of Novi SadNaslov predavanja (HR): Naslov će biti naknadno objavljenNaslov predavanja (EN): To be announcedTip predavanja: Matematički kolokvij Datum i time: 16.04.2026., 14:00 Predavaonica: Predavaonica 3Naslov će biti naknadno objavljenTo be announcedMatematički kolokvij16.04.2026.Davide Palitta Više... Predavač: Davide Palitta Institucija: Alma Mater Studiorum, Università di Bologna, ItalijaTip predavanja: Seminar za optimizaciju i primjene Datum i time: 27.05.2026., 12:00 Predavaonica: Predavaonica 2Seminar za optimizaciju i primjene27.05.2026.Gazi Mahmud Alam Više... Predavač: Gazi Mahmud Alam Institucija: Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, USATip predavanja: Seminar za optimizaciju i primjene Datum i time: 10.06.2026., 12:00 Predavaonica: Predavaonica 2Seminar za optimizaciju i primjene10.06.2026.Prof. dr. sc. Slobodan Filipovski Više... Predavač: Prof. dr. sc. Slobodan Filipovski Institucija: Department of Mathematics, University of Primorska, KoperNaslov predavanja (HR): Naslov će biti naknadno objavljenTip predavanja: Matematički kolokvij Datum i time: 11.06.2026., 14:00 Predavaonica: Predavaonica 3Naslov će biti naknadno objavljenMatematički kolokvij11.06.2026.